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materially mislead anyone and dismissed the claim. The
court of appeals affirmed.
Athletic games are not original works of authorship
and, therefore, are not protected under the Copyright
Act. Furthermore, the Copyright Act preempted the
NBA's misappropriation claim. To survive preemption, a
claim must satisfy a five-prong test: (1) costs are

associated with the generation of information; (2)
information is time sensitive; (3) defendant "free-rides"
from plaintiff's effort; (4) direct competition exists
between plaintiff and defendant; (5) "free-ride" reduces
incentive to produce information. Accordingly, the NBA
cause of action failed because state law did not apply
and federal law did not allow it to proceed.. • •

E-mail stories detailing the rape and murder of a
young woman do not constitute a "true threat"
by Philip Tortorich

Intimidation, fear - these are
common responses to threats
disseminated on electronic mail. In
order to protect individuals from
badgering and torment, the United
States Congress passed 18 U.S.C. §
875(c) ("§ 875(c)") prohibiting the
transmission of any communication
containing a threat. Although the
First Amendment protects free
speech, language containing a "true
threat" is not protected, and, thus, is
criminal under § 875(c). In United
States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492
(6th Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc
denied (Apr. 14, 1997), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit clarified the requisite
elements of § 875(c) and defined
what constitutes a "threat."

Internet used for sexual
fantasies
Between November 1994 and
January 1995, the defendant,
Abraham Jacob Alkhabaz, a.k.a.
Jake Baker, ("Alkhabaz"), commu-
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nicated via the Internet with Arthur
Gonda ("Gonda"). The two communicated sexual stories and fantasies
using electronic messages ("Email"). Alkhabaz used his computer
in Michigan; Gonda was connected
online in Ontario, Canada. The
messages typically consisted of
sexual descriptions involving
violence against women and
children. Alkhabaz was active on a
Usenet news group, "alt.sex.stories,"
where he posted fictional stories
concerning the "abduction, rape,
torture, mutilation, and murder of
women and young girls." Since
these stories were posted on the
Usenet, they could be accessed by
anyone with a computer and
modem.
In January, 1995, Alkhabaz
posted a story concerning one of his
classmates at the University of
Michigan. This story gave the name
of the classmate and portrayed her
being tortured. The story detailed
the multiple rape of this young
woman, culminating in her murder

by igniting gasoline poured over her
body. The E-mail messages also
indicated a willingness to carry out
the actions. On February 9, 1995,
Alkhabaz was arrested and criminally charged with violating 18
U.S.C. § 875(c) by engaging in an
interstate commerce communication
involving a threat to kidnap or injure
another person.

Government must satisfy
three elements under §

875(c)
Title 18, United States Code,
Section 875(c) states: "Whoever
transmits in interstate or foreign
commerce any communication
containing any threat to kidnap any
person or any threat to injure the
person of another, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both." 18
U.S.C. § 875(c). In the present case,
the court concluded that the Government must meet three elements: (1)
a transmission in interstate [or
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foreign] commerce; (2) a communication containing a threat; and (3)
the threat involves the injury [or
kidnapping] of a person. At issue
before this court was only the
second element, whether the
communication constituted a threat.
The first element is satisfied because
the communications crossed
international borders. The third
element is met because the E-mail
contained a number of specific
references to actual injury to a
specific person.

Threats: Serious
expressions to inflict harm
which are designed to
intimidate
The court held that a communication is a "threat" if a "reasonable
person would take the statement as a
serious expression of an intention to
inflict bodily harm and would
perceive such expressions as being
communicated to effect some
change or achieve some goal
through intimidation." The court
held that only general intent is
required in order to satisfy the mens
rea for § 875(c). Therefore, the
Government must show that "a
reasonable person would take the
defendant's statements as a serious
expression of an intention to inflict
bodily harm."
Further, the court held that a
specific actus reus must be met.
Although the statute provides that
"any" communication containing a
threat suffices, the court reasoned
that a literal application would lead
to absurd results (i.e., one who takes
notes about this case and sends them
to a newspaper would be in violation
of § 875(c)).
In order to define which acts
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constitute a violation of § 875(c), the
court inquired into the type of
communication Congress intended
to prohibit. According to the court,
threats are "tools that are employed
when one wished to have some
effect, or achieve some goal,
through intimidation." The goal
need not be serious or reprehensible.
For example, a goal may be extortionate, coercive, or for the advancement of political objectives. Also,
the court held that the goal may be
communicated for a "seemingly
innocuous purpose." As an example,
the court explained that a person
who falsely makes a bomb threat is
considered to have communicated a
threat, even if the only purpose of
the communication is to create a
prank.

Recipient's sense of wellbeing must be endangered
After determining what constitutes the actus reus, the court held
that violation of § 875(c) must be
viewed objectively from the
perspective of the receiver. Therefore, the court held that an otherwise
threatening communication may not
constitute a threat if it is not sent to
the person[s] who would be intimidated by the communication,
because in this situation it is
"unlikely that the recipient will be
intimidated or her peace of mind
disturbed." Thus, the court must
determine whether the sender
intended to intimidate the recipient
through the use of the communication. Only when an intent to
intimidate is present does the
communication constitute a threat.
Referring to the aforementioned
hypothetical, a person who mails
notes about this trial to a newspaper

cannot be in violation of § 875(c),
since that individual did not intend
to intimidate; the newspaper would
not believe its safety to be compromised.

Communication by way of
E-mail does not constitute
"threat"
The court held that E-mail
communications in this case are not
"threats." First, the court held that
the requirement of actus reus is not
met because Alkhabaz did not
attempt, or intend, to achieve some
goal through the use of intimidation.
Therefore, the communication, no
matter how sadistic and misdirected,
cannot constitute a threat. Further,
the court held that the communications between Alkhabaz and Gonda
do not constitute "true threats"
since, the recipient's sense of
personal well-being was not
disturbed. The court held that even if
a reasonable person could conclude
that the communication threatened
the well-being of another, the
communication still fails to become
a threat where there is no indication
of the goal or that intimidation will
be used.
In summary, the court declared
that any communication that
threatens another will be considered
a "threat" only if the communication
is in furtherance of some goal
through the use of intimidation.
Also, a reasonable person in the
recipient's position must perceive
the communication to be a reasonable threat to injure recipient.

Court declines to address
First Amendment issue
E-mail communications are not
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exempt from the statute. To the
contrary, E-mail messages are
subject to the three-part test developed by the court. However, the
conclusion reached by the majority
is subject to skepticism; the dissent
argued that Congress intended to
criminalize all communications
containing a threat. The stories and
the E-mail messages involved in this
case contained threats; accordingly,
the court declined to address any
First Amendment issues raised by
the parties.

Dissent opines intent as
irrelevant
Judge Krupansky dissented,
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believing the words of § 875(c) to be
simple and clear, requiring only that
the alleged communication contain
any threat to injure any person,
made for any reason. The dissent
noted that prior precedent "compels
the conclusion that 'threats' include
all reasonably credible communications which express the speaker's
objective intent to injure another
person." Specifically, the dissent
believed the intent to intimidate is
irrelevant, since Congress could
have included it as a factor.
The dissent reprinted the actual
communication between Alkhabaz
and Gonda, as well as a number of
the E-mail messages between
Alkhabaz and Gonda concerning

their sexual fantasies. The dissent
criticized the court for added "extra
legislative" elements to the law. The
plain language of the statute,
according to the dissent, would
indicate that this communication is a
threat. The dissent further stated that
it is irrelevant whether the "originator of the message intended to
intimidate or coerce anyone."
Rather, the proper inquiry should be
whether a reasonable recipient
would objectively "believe that the
speaker was serious about his stated
intention.".
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